Sep 18 2024 49 mins 381
In Episode 279 of the Defensive Security Podcast, Jerry Bell and Andrew Kalat discuss the latest cybersecurity news and issues. Stories include Transportation for London requiring in-person password resets after a security incident, Google’s new ‘air-gapped’ backup service, the impact of a rogue ‘Whois’ server, and the ongoing ramifications of the Moveit breach. The episode also explores workforce challenges in cybersecurity, such as the gap between the number of professionals and the actual needs of organizations, and discusses the trend of just-in-time talent versus long-term training and development.
Links:
- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/tfl-requires-in-person-password-resets-for-30-000-employees-after-hack/
- https://www.securityweek.com/google-introduces-air-gapped-backup-vault-to-thwart-ransomware/
- https://arstechnica.com/security/2024/09/rogue-whois-server-gives-researcher-superpowers-no-one-should-ever-have/
- https://www.cybersecuritydive.com/news/global-cyber-workforce-flatlines-isc2/726667/
- https://www.cybersecuritydive.com/news/moveit-wisconsin-medicare/726441/
Transcript:
Jerry: [00:00:00] Here we go. Today is Sunday, September 15th, 2024. And this is episode 279 of the defensive security podcast. My name is Jerry Bell and joining me today as always is Mr. Andrew Kalat.
Andrew: Good evening, Jerry. Happy Sunday to you.
Jerry: Happy Sunday, just a reminder that the thoughts and opinions we express on the show are ours do not represent those of our employers or.
Andrew: present, or future.
Jerry: for those of us who have employers, that is not that I’m bitter or anything. It’s,
Andrew: It’s, I envy your lack of a job. I don’t envy your lack of a paycheck. So that is the conflict.
Jerry: It’s very interesting times right now for me.
Andrew: Indeed.
Jerry: All right. So our first story today comes from bleeping computer. And the title here is TFL, which is transportation for London requires in person, password [00:01:00] resets for 30, 000 employees. So those of you who may not be aware transportation for London had suffered what I guess would has been described as a nebulous security incident.
They haven’t really pushed out a lot of information about what happened. They have said that it does not affect customers. But it apparently does impact some back office systems that did take off certain parts of their services offline, like I think. They couldn’t issue refunds. And there were a few other transportation related things that were broken as a result.
But I think in the aftermath of trying to make sure that they’ve evicted the bad guy who, by the way, apparently has been arrested.
Andrew: That’s rare. Somebody actually got arrested.
Jerry: yeah. And not only that, but apparently it was somebody local.
Andrew: Oops.
Jerry: In in the country which may or may not be associated with an unknown named [00:02:00] threat actor, by the way, that was involved in some other ransomware attacks.
Andrew: Kids don’t hack in your own backyard.
Jerry: That’s right. Make sure you don’t have extradition treaties with where you’re attacking. So what I thought was most interesting was the, their, the approach here to getting back up and going they, they had disabled. So TFL had disabled the access for all of their employees and the requiring their employees to show up at a designated site to prove their identity in order to regain access.
This isn’t the first. Organization that’s done this, but it is something that I suspect a lot of organizations don’t think about the logistics of, in the aftermath of a big hack. And if you’re a large company spread out all over the place, the logistics of that could be pretty daunting.
Andrew: Yeah. It’s wild to me that they want in person. [00:03:00] Verification of 30, 000 employees. But given the nature of their company and business, I’m guessing they’re all very centrally located. Used to going to physical offices, but man, can you imagine if you were a remote employee and you don’t have any office anywhere near you, how would you handle that? I’m not, I’m probably not going to get on a plane to go get my password re enabled.
Jerry: Exactly.
Andrew: You know what it did, remind me of though is, remember back PGP and PGP key signing?
Jerry: Oh, the key parties. Yes.
Andrew: Yes. Where, You basically, it’s a web of trust and people you trust could verify and sign another key. Like at a key signing party, because we were fun back then, that’s what nerds used to do. And then that’s how you had the circle trust. So maybe they could do something similar where verified employee could verify another employee, then you’ve got the whole insider threat issue, et cetera. Yeah. It
just reminded me of,
Jerry: No, nobody trusts Bob’s.
Andrew: [00:04:00] It’s true. Your friend, Bob, how many times has he been in prison?
Most recently, like where Rwanda? I think I heard,
Jerry: He’s got the frequent visitor card.
Andrew: but yet has some of the best stories.
Jerry: He does, he definitely does. so apparently they make reference to a similar incident that happened at Dick’s sporting goods. I will emphasize the sporting goods. They had a similar issue and that is a nationwide retailer here in the U S at least, I don’t know if they’re they’re outside of the U S and so that really wouldn’t be possible, with transportation for London.
I assume that most of the people associated with it are local or. Or within a reasonable driving distance or commuting distances, the case may be. But in the situation with a retailer, a nationwide retailer, I think they had to go with virtual in person. So they basically had zoom meetings [00:05:00] with employees and I assume had them show like pictures of their government ID and so on.
So the logistics of that is interesting. And. It isn’t really something I’ve spent a lot of time thinking about. And but I know in the aftermath of a big attack like this, establishing, trust and certainty and who has access to your network would be super important. So I think it’s I think it’s worth.
Putting into your game plan,
Andrew: Yeah, it is. It is a wild one. And what do you trust? Especially in the age of, deep fakes and easily convincing AI copies of other employees. And I don’t know, it’s an interesting one.
Jerry: right?
Andrew: Ciao.
Jerry: our next, yeah, it was it was certainly a an unfolding story, which I don’t think is over yet based on everything I’m reading.
Andrew: I did see one quote in here that made me chuckle, which is this is a quote from the transport [00:06:00] agency added on their employee hub. Some customers may ask questions about the security of our network and their data. First and foremost, we must reassure that our network is safe. Okay, define safe. That’s just us
being
Safe ish.
Jerry: safe ish, safe now,
Andrew: Safe, safe y. It resembles something that is sometimes called appropriately safe. Based, based on the criteria that we came up with, it’s completely safe.
Jerry: which I’m sure is true because they they had also had a clop. Ransomware infection, I guess a couple of months prior to this. So
Andrew: What do you use for clop? Is that like a cream? Is that like a, how is
that treated typically?
Jerry: every time I hear clap, I, it takes me back to the Monty Python, the coconut horse trotting.
That’s what I think about when I hear the word clap,
Andrew: That’s
fair.
Jerry: [00:07:00] which is oddly appropriate given that this is in the UK, which is where where Monty Python hails from.
Andrew: I thought you say where they have coconuts.
Jerry: Only if they’re if they’re transported by swallows.
Andrew: You youngins will just have to go.
Jerry: Gotta go watch that movie. Alright, it’s worth it. I, by the way, I remember making my son, both my sons watch it, and they protested. And now, I think they’ve each seen it like 30 or 40 times,
Andrew: so when you say process, did you like have to duct tape them to a chair and like pry their eyes open and
do a whole, yeah, train spotting situation?
Jerry: I think they thought it was like an actual movie about the Holy Grail.
Andrew: Which, why would they be opposed to that? That could also be interesting.
Jerry: I don’t know.
Andrew: Indiana Jones did a fine movie on it.
Jerry: It’s true. But it, that does not hold a candle to [00:08:00] the Monty Python Holy Grail movie. Let’s just be
Andrew: We, we learned a lot. We learned about facing the peril. We learned that Camelot is a silly place. And we learned how to end a movie when you don’t have a better plan. Again, way off topic, but you young’uns will just have to go discover. Do you,
Jerry: So back on topic, our next story comes from security week. And the title here is Google introduces air gapped backup vault to thwart ransomware. And I’m going to put quotes as they do over air gapped because as they describe it, it is logically air gapped, not. Actually air gap. So what, and by the way I don’t necessarily mean to take away from the utility of the solution that they’re offering here, but calling it air gap, I think is maybe a little bit of a misnomer.
So they are offering Google they being [00:09:00] Google are offering a service where you as a Google cloud customer can store data. Backups to a storage service that does not appear as part of your cloud account. It’s part of a Google managed project that is transparent to your account. So if somebody were to take over your account, for example or to compromise systems within your account, they actually wouldn’t be able to do anything with that backup which I think is a pretty smart the one thing that I was wondering, obviously that you are not necessarily protected in the case that Google’s cloud itself becomes the victim of something bad, but that is, is a kind of a theoretical issue at this point.
But the one that concerns me a bit is what happens as we have seen in some other. [00:10:00] There was a, I’m forgetting the name at the moment that there was a company whose AWS account at the time was basically deleted and they had all of their data, all of their backups in their cloud account and they had it, split across different availability zones and it, it didn’t matter because they were, the actor actually deleted everything in their account and I believe they actually deleted the account itself.
And I do wonder the same thing, if your account were to be taken over would that backup persist? Would you have the ability after the fact to, to prove to Google who you were and be able to resurrect that. I,
Andrew: Do you mean the one that happened accidentally that Google did with that Australian pension fund or like a bad actor getting in and deleting it?
Jerry: Bad actor that got
Andrew: Gotcha. Yep.
Jerry: There was a it was a GitHub competitor,
Andrew: Yes.
Jerry: [00:11:00] can’t remember the name. It was
Andrew: I will look at,
Jerry: several years ago. Yeah, I do think, and I’ve said this, I say this an increasing amount. I do think we are. On the cusp of, much more aggressive, what I’ll call cloud native attacks where adversaries are actually attacking, not just the workloads in the cloud, but actually, the cloud resources themselves, the cloud accounts and whatnot.
So I think as time goes on, things like this are going to become much more important and questions like what I just asked, I think are going to become Increasingly important to
Andrew: yeah it’s, interesting that it makes sense, first of all to make sure that my, if I’ve got a bad actor or ransom or whatever, that’s out there deleting things, I don’t want it to just delete my backups, which is something we’ve always talked about is it could be a weakness in your automated systems.
If they’ve got full admin rights into your cloud environment, what stops them from going [00:12:00] after your backups? So that makes sense. It is interesting how strong that quote unquote logical air gapping is. It makes me wonder a little, somebody should probably test it, but I’m surprised this wasn’t offered before, honestly. It also makes me think, remember the days when we used to back up the tape and send those tapes off site to underground storage facilities? And
Jerry: And half the time the tapes would fall off the truck
Andrew: right.
Jerry: built spilled out under the freeway. Yes,
Andrew: And you never test restoring them, and then when you do need to restore them, it’s gonna take 43 months and half of them are bad.
It was a weird time.
Jerry: recall the tapes and the tapes will come back in a locked box and there’ll be tapes missing.
Andrew: Right.
Jerry: It was just Like the grand old days. I like, I, I don’t know why we don’t still do that.
Andrew: I won’t go on the, we’re old rant, but boy, it makes me feel old. But this makes sense. Like what I’m also curious about, I haven’t looked into this is, how many versions of backups do you [00:13:00] have? Because the other thing I think about is you’ve got ransomware. And it automatically backs up how many iterations in, or am I just backing up encrypted data I can’t restore because it’s encrypted.
The backup system doesn’t know the difference. It’s just backing up an iterative change. So that’s something else to think about is okay, how many snapshots back can I go? Because that starts to get expensive, but if I’m just like automatically backing up my encrypted data. Oops, it’s interesting and I like the concept and it’s meant to fight one particular source of pain, which is, ransomware, deleting your backups.
Jerry: Yeah. I really liked the concept too. I think things like this are going to become increasingly important as this time goes on. Happy to see things like this starting to emerge,
Andrew: Indeed.
Jerry: but now, again, it comes back to making sure that it is actually working.
Andrew: Yeah. And testing like a restore
and [00:14:00] do the assumptions you have work.
And that’s one thing not to go off on a bit of a side rant that I see a lot is organizations don’t have enough time built into their. IT or security schedules to actually test these things. They just Oh, we think it’s going to work.
And the first time they tested is during a crisis, which is a terrible idea. You want to be able to test like when you’re not in crisis mode and see how well this stuff works.
Jerry: Absolutely. Our next story comes from Ars Technica and the title is rogue. Who is server gives researchers superpowers. No one should ever have.
Andrew: This one was crazy.
Jerry: Yeah. So there’s a company called Watchtower of course, is all things tech. Now it isn’t spelled correctly. I won’t hold that against them. One of their researchers found during their stay at Black hat that the dot Moby top level domain had recently changed the location of its, who is [00:15:00] server.
So previously it was a domain hosted on a dot net top level domain, but apparently over some time in the recent past, they moved that to unsurprisingly a name hosted on the dot Moby TLD. And I guess through probably some bit of, corporate cost savings or missteps don’t know.
They let that domain, they let the dot net version of that domain expire, which is problematic. And so this person realized that registered the domain and then actually started seeing legitimate requests, who is requests coming in. And then they set up a, who is server and. Found that they would have had the opportunity to do quite a few bad things, like creating TLS certificates [00:16:00] for for domains, because VeriSign and others were still pointing their who is to the old.
net. So they hadn’t, completely switched over from the NET domain to the MOBI domain, and as a result chaos ensued and it’s really hard to put bounds on how bad this could be, right? There’s, when you, they go through quite a few different situations that this could be. This could have allowed, for example, intercepting email and, lots of different telemetry based attacks.
But I don’t even know that we have a good handle on the art of the possible when something like this happens.
Andrew: Yeah. Plus the the TLS certificate trust that comes natively with this, which is massive. Like that just can cascade into a whole bunch of shenanigans when you can [00:17:00] own The authority around TLS certificates around an entire domain like that. That’s huge.
Jerry: Which they were able to do in this instance. So really bad for sure. I thought it was interesting because in, in my former role, I saw lots of situations similar to this. And I, and that just in my former, immediately former role, but in lots of former roles, companies often registered or create internal domains.
And those domains sometimes are, they start off as. Like they start off as trying to think of a good good, a good example. Let’s say like that fun, it’s stupid one, right? When you created your active directory domain back in 1997, like that TLD wasn’t around, but over the
Andrew: Right.
Jerry: That, that [00:18:00] did become a domain and, nobody thinks twice about it. And suddenly now you’re susceptible to a whole class of attacks. And I think there’s a broad range of problems that the industry has associated with domain names either expiring or for example, a lot of companies as they acquire other companies, they they, Transition.
That company’s email to the acquired company’s domain. And over time, sometimes, not all the time, but they let those domains expire, somebody comes along and you can pretty much guarantee that there’s still almost certainly valid email going to that domain. And so there’s, I think there’s this whole class of problems.
That we don’t often, it’s a super simple and dumb problem space that has emerged [00:19:00] around domain clashes, domain problems, people letting domains expiring. So I I don’t feel like this is something that is, is well represented in different security frameworks and, policies and whatnot, because it’s off, it’s often the corner, but I, it is definitely, and has been, is this, proves it has been, and can be a big source of problems.
And so I, I think it’s really important to keep your eye on this.
Andrew: Yeah, I agree completely. And it’s to the point you made earlier about ADs or internal domains being set up. And then suddenly that many years on the line becoming a new top level domain. It reminds me of when people didn’t follow RFC 1918 and used random IP addresses that later are routable and, can’t figure out why they’re having weird Transcribed Routing [00:20:00] issues talking to certain parts of the internet and not others and it’s like there’s
Jerry: That
Andrew: got to watch that.
And what’s interesting is this like with all respect But a lot of folks today don’t understand how the plumbing of the internet works anymore. It’s been abstracted away from them And like a lot of people this sort of problem with DNS reminds me a little bit of how fragile BGP is.
And very few people really understand BGP anymore. They don’t have to, they don’t need to know it. That’s a SaaS provider problem. That’s a cloud provider problem. But it’s very much a real problem. Like you and I, at one point in our career, we went through the process of registering for our own. Slash 19 and figure out all the fun of what it took to route that and share that. And all those things that came with it which I think was valuable, not to just pat ourselves on the back, but it’s interesting today when you go talk to people about some of the complexities of DNS, they have no idea. They don’t. They don’t. know how all this works. They don’t know that this is even a susceptible problem, because I think there’s this inherent [00:21:00] belief that there’s just some overriding authority managing all the top level domains and all the top level Whois servers. There’s not. Be careful.
Jerry: Yeah, definitely. Definitely. All right. The the next story is this one is it’s a bit of a followup to when we talked about last time. It comes from cybersecurity dive and the title is global cybersecurity workforce growth, flatlines stalling at 5. 5 million pros. This is based off of a report released by the ISC squared, which is the, for those of you who don’t know, they’re the people who create and maintain the CISSP and a bunch of other.
Certification programs. What they identified is that the growth of the cyber security workforce grew a 10th of a percent year to year, which is interesting. [00:22:00] Like from five, five ish million to 5. 5 million. It
Andrew: Wait, that’s not a tenth of a percent. that’s, 10%.
Jerry: you’re right. 5. 45 to 5. 5. There you
Andrew: There you go.
Jerry: you. I can do math. I
Andrew: I’m here to help. I’m here to help.
Jerry: promise, but this was the first time that, that the growth is really stalled in quite a few years.
They what I found most interesting with this particular report in this particular article is it explained something that we continue to talk about. Both on the show and as an industry about the kind of the dichotomy between people’s experience in trying to get a job in security and the way that the industry talks about the number of unfilled [00:23:00] security jobs, because those two things, as we talked about last time, again, aren’t.
In concert, right there’s a gap somewhere. And this one for the first time started to explain it in a way that made sense to me. And what they describe is that the workforce, like the number of people who are employed in the security sphere went up very quickly.
The number of people that are needed to keep companies secure, as identified through interviews with companies, is growing dramatically. And outpaces by a large margin, the number of people who are qualified to work where it [00:24:00] breaks down is that just because, I say that I need. 50 more people on my team to keep our company secure.
Does it mean that I get to go hire 50 people? It just means in order to do what I think is a responsible job, I’m making this up completely, by the way. In order to do a good job of keeping my company secure, I would need 50 more people than I have. And so
Andrew: Right.
Jerry: then gets counted in the total number. Of these quote unfilled security roles,
Andrew: Really that’s just the,
Jerry: exist.
Andrew: That’s just the beginning point of negotiation for your budget.
Jerry: Yes. Yes.
Is yes.
Andrew: So when they refer to workforce, do they mean the number of people employed
in the cybersecurity industry or the [00:25:00] number of people available to fill jobs in the industry?
Jerry: They’re talking about the number of people butts in seats.
Andrew: Okay. So there could be, if they’re saying there’s 5. 5 million people in the cybersecurity workforce industry collecting a paycheck but there’s 10 million qualified people seeking jobs. That’s one of your gaps, right? There’s just not the jobs out there for the number of qualified people. Which if that’s true, which we’ve heard the opposite, there’s a skills gap and there’s a capability gap, which could go back to some companies may be asking for the wrong things, like 10 years of experience in a technology that’s been around for two years, which we’ve seen over and over again. Or if there’s too many people chasing too few jobs, it can drive down salaries. So I don’t know. It’s interesting. If people are willing to accept jobs for less, basically in competition with somebody else, that can also depress wages or at least cap [00:26:00] growth. So I don’t know. We keep hearing very, to your point, very conflicting things about The market in the industry including Hey, we don’t make it easy for new people or entry level roles or mentoring or journeyman roles or ways to bring people in that we can build up people and you want to hire experienced people, where do they start getting experience?
So I think some of that comes to play too.
Jerry: I think it’s all intertwined, right? They, in the article, they point out that There are 5. 5 million butts in seats in the security sphere. They believe based on their data that there are, there’s a need for 10. 2 million people, right? So that, that creates a big gap. But again, that doesn’t mean that there’s 4.
7 million unfilled jobs.
Andrew: Yeah. I
certainly don’t see those job listings,
Jerry: it means [00:27:00] that we, some at a top level, it means that we think in order to do a responsible job of protecting every company, we would have to have 4. 7 million more people working in security than are available today now, but where I think folds back into what you were saying about wages is that, for a long time, security people have had it great.
And I say that as one of them, we were pretty highly compensated and so it’s a difficult thing, especially as of late, it’s a difficult thing to continue adding more and more people to your payroll at the salaries that people are getting. And so there is part of me, as we talked about last time, the U.
- government is launching an initiative to train up, hundreds of thousands of more people to enter the workforce. The reality is, those people are going to be [00:28:00] competing with people who are already unable to find jobs, but the net effect, I think of that is going to be deflationary.
On on, on cybersecurity job salaries.
Andrew: It’s possible.
It’s, yeah.
Jerry: and then in doing so theoretically will be able to hire more of them.
Andrew: Yeah, I think the danger is always, is that training going to align with what companies need?
Jerry: I don’t think so because I think we have created this and I know that we’ve gone way off into the security podcast. But I think. And look I had, I managed a very large team in a side of a very large company that had, I had a, had an interesting vantage point. What I observed is that [00:29:00] companies have adopted this position of what I refer to as just in time talent, we, we want.
We, we create this profile of expectations of what people need to have in order to come on board for an entry role, entry level role, like you’ve got to have 10 years of experience and you’ve got to know, all of these specific, very specific security tools for an entry level role.
Like how do you get an entry level role if you don’t have. You get, you end up in the, into this kind of catch 22, but on the other side, one of the concerns I’ve got is that as an industry for a long time, security people came out of it, right? You were, you came out of application development or system administration or network engineering or help desk.
and a lot of. These people had a [00:30:00] very broad and deep background in, maybe not every aspect of it, but in lots of aspects of it. And now, security has become a field unto its own. And so you go through school and you you graduate with a degree in security and it’s all been about security and not necessarily about the implementation of it, the implementation of, and I, in operation of it inside companies.
And I think that not, I’m not, by the way, I’m not in any way downplaying the importance of the stuff that you learn school, what I’m saying is I think you coming out, you come out lacking some of the important context that you need in order to be effective.
The other side. Is that a lot of that context tends to be pretty specific to a company.
And I think that where we’re at is that companies have lost, largely lost the patients for whatever [00:31:00] reason to train people, to do on the job training and grow people and. And that scares me to be not only from like the human aspect, but also from like the ability to be effective and whatnot, because now I think we’re inhibiting artificially governing the effectiveness of people because we’ve got.
These people, we got people who have relatively narrow sets of skills coming into the workforce. And I suppose in some instances that’s okay, but I think it, it is a I don’t know maybe I’m just getting old.
Andrew: No, I agree with your point. And again, I’m also getting old, but I find there are very few generalists anymore. Everybody’s very hyper specialized. And I think That’s a bit of a shame. Yeah, you could be super good at one particular thing and that’s very valuable and there’s value in that, but I also find a lot of value in it.
[00:32:00] Generalists who come into security just have such a breadth of understanding of how these things are supposed to work together and what’s normal that I think it it va it, it brings a lot of value to the job.
And it goes back to what we were saying earlier. People don’t understand DNS, they don’t understand bgp, they don’t understand IP routing because they don’t have to. And I guess that’s okay. I guess maybe the world has gotten so complex that this is the way it needs to be, but I do think it’s a real shame becoming like IBM massive company. Those are the types of companies that I think should be able to grow their own talent with mentorship and the whole concept of the way we used to do things with apprenticeship and raising people up and giving them that opportunity to grow and build that skillset. And, maybe their salary is a little low initially, but as they grow and hopefully that skillset will grow and the salary will grow, or [00:33:00] sadly, they probably will just bounce to another company. That’s, I think what companies worry about
is you train them and they leave. What if you don’t train them and they stay?
Yes. The way I could counter that, but it is a problem. I don’t know that I have a solution, but I’m a big fan of trying to promote people who are interested from it and the security, not that one is better than the other, but I do think those folks with it backgrounds have a lot of basic understanding that I think really helps with general security engineering and SOC.
The other thing I’d say is it takes a long time to ramp up. I don’t know that companies, Respect that anymore. It may take six months to a year to really be effective in a, at least a security operations role and understand what normal is for a company. And it feels like everybody’s moving too fast for that now. I guess this is the whole get off my lawn speech. It’s an interesting problem.
Jerry: I, I, from a an individual standpoint, I think it’s. [00:34:00] It’s clearly a much more competitive market than it used to be. And I think it’s becoming increasingly important for people who are serious about getting into it and finding a job to be able to differentiate yourself. And I know that’s.
Heretical to say in some circles, if you want the job, I’m not saying that you have to work, 200 hours a week, but you’ve got to be able to separate yourself from the pack. Otherwise, I don’t know what to say. You’re, you’ll be looking for work for a long time.
Andrew: Just don’t start a defensive security competitive podcast. We don’t need the competition,
please.
Jerry: no we definitely don’t. I, by the way I for those of you who know, I, I recently lost my job and it’s okay. Not complaining. It’s actually been an amazing experience. And I’ve been working with a career coach who’s awesome. By the way if you have the opportunity to work with a career [00:35:00] coach, like that’s probably one of the best things because they can call bullshit on your, like they hold you to account.
But one of the things that, that mine told me was this is a difficult. Economy right now to find a job. It takes a long time to find, and a lot of false starts and a lot of tries to find a job right now. And I don’t know if it’s like historical at a historical low. I don’t know. But it’s definitely, I’ve got kids that have recently graduated from college and I look at the struggles they are having with finding jobs as recent college graduates and it’s a difficult, just a difficult economy and I don’t see that getting better.
Anytime soon, maybe when, and if interest rates go back to a negative, then we’ll start seeing lots of lots of startups again, but I don’t know.
Andrew: I do think [00:36:00] certainly this is a well trodden road that other people do a better job talking about than I do. But I think that there are certain roles that we have treated poorly. Culturally, like blue collar jobs and trade jobs that have a huge, massive shortage of workers who are desperate for workers. But we have, and those are good, paying jobs with great benefits, we went down this path of everybody needs to go to college and everybody needs a white collar job. And I think that’s, Not great for people or our society. And the other thing I’d be curious about, you’re seeing both sides of it.
You’re at a very senior point in your career. And my first thought would be, is it tougher to find a senior level job? Cause there’s less of those in theory. But you’re also saying, your kids right out of college are basically looking for their first main major career job, which is the opposite of that spectrum and they’re struggling. I did tell you underwater basket weaving would be a tough role for them to find a career in, but they insisted.
Jerry: You, [00:37:00] you warned him. I it’s fair.
I think it’s all up and down the scale. So certainly for me, if I if in one, I do another thing, it’ll probably be an exec another more senior level executive type role. I don’t know if it’ll be a CISO again. That was hard and I don’t know, I don’t know if I got that in me again.
It was fun for sure. When I talk to my kids and other young people, one of the bits of feedback I get is there’s been a lot of people who have lost their jobs. And I think this is also true, maybe particularly in the IT space, lots of layoffs in the IT world over the past 18 months.
And those people have experience and they’re unable to find jobs necessarily at the same level that they were. And so they may be, they may be competing. I guess what I’m trying to say is entry level people. Who are coming out of college may very well be competing against [00:38:00] people who are not entry level for entry level jobs, because those other people can’t find other jobs.
And so they’re, they’re trying to find any kind of work. And so people entering the workforce are not competing against other people entering the workforce. They’re competing with, other
Andrew: yeah.
Jerry: who may have experience, who have recently lost their job. And I think that’s it is what it is,
A challenge.
So
Andrew: yeah. One last thing I’ll say on this is that in theory, the unemployment rate is low. So are we just going through a cyclical change where those jobs are moving to other areas? And I. T. and I don’t know. See, this is the challenge. You saw this conflicting data of. We have all these unfulfilled jobs, but then people can’t get hired.
I don’t know. I don’t know what to say.
Just, I’m thankful I have a job and I will do my best not to be so frustrated tomorrow, Monday morning, as I normally be.
Jerry: I’m thankful to be in the spot I’m [00:39:00] in, even though I don’t have a job,
Andrew: You do have a job. Your job is to entertain me on this podcast and our 12 listeners.
Jerry: hopefully I’m doing it, doing okay.
Andrew: You’re meeting expectations.
Jerry: Good good. All right. Our last story also comes from cybersecurity dive. And the title here is move it. Victims are still coming forward. This time it’s Wisconsin Medicare. There, there isn’t anything necessarily new here. We obviously were on hiatus when the big move it breach happened.
Happened in the second quarter of 2023, but we are now 18 months on about, and we’re still hearing about net new victims of this. And I find it just mind boggling. Now this particular entity reported to the centers for medic Medicare and [00:40:00] Medicaid that they were breached back in July, but presumably the actual breach happened, Much earlier than that, only recently detected.
And I don’t know why that is. I don’t know if
Andrew: I certainly hope that, I certainly hope that like they hadn’t gone unpatched all this long and just suddenly got popped.
Jerry: I doubt that, but what I it’s possible, right? It’s
But the thing that I’ve been concerned about it, and again, this is an asset management problem. Like I don’t know. How many of these things were out there that companies didn’t realize,
Andrew: yeah.
Jerry: Like being managed by a subcontractor to a subcontractor and Hey, the magic just happens.
I pay the bill and the files just appear. I don’t know how it happened.
Andrew: yeah, I look at this like understanding your attack surface, like to me, you really need to understand everything that’s associated with the company that’s open to the internet. I know that’s not the only way to attack [00:41:00] things. I know that things start at endpoints with phishing attacks, but nonetheless, for these sorts of widespread, vulnerable, remote code exploits sort of things, you have to know what’s open to the internet that Are associated with.
Jerry: Yes.
Andrew: I just feel like that’s table stakes. You got to know your attack surface and a lot of companies don’t like it’s a one. It’s a tough problem. But two, it’s not something that a lot of companies spend time, I think, worrying about. But I think this is a great example. What if this has been sitting out there? Just got ignored. Nobody’s really maintaining it. Nobody’s really patching it. Nobody really knows, but I think in cases like this, if you’re a security organization, something like Moveit pops, it’d be nice to look at a list and say, huh, do we have Moveit? Oh, yeah, we do. We should go fix that.
Jerry: And not only do you have it, but do your suppliers have it
Andrew: Send them an Excel sheet for them to fill out. You’ll be
fine.
Jerry: then have them send it to their suppliers and their suppliers send [00:42:00] it to their suppliers.
Andrew: And eventually it just circles back around.
Jerry: Turtles all the way down. You know what the other, again, because we didn’t have a chance to talk about it at the time. The other issue I think that really exacerbated this move it. Issue, obviously this was a very widely used, which blows my mind.
I was much more widely used than I ever would have thought. A file transfer tool that that progress software, I think it was progress software, right? Anyway whoever maintains it, sorry, progress. If I got you wrong you’ve got your own problems. So I’m not going to feel too bad. The issue is this.
application had a vulnerability that made it very trivial for adversaries to pull files off of the appliance. One of the things that came out in the aftermath of that is that people would allow files to be uploaded. And then just sit [00:43:00] there, like they would obviously copy them off, but they wouldn’t clean them out.
And so
Andrew: Look, that’s not part of that’s not part of my KPIs, man. My job is to get the file over there, not delete it later.
Jerry: right.
Andrew: Look, I’m,
Jerry: thing that isn’t in frameworks. I was listening to a book today and they made reference to the old George box quote, all models are wrong. Some models are useful. And I got to
Andrew: yeah,
Jerry: like all security frameworks are wrong. Some are useful and
Andrew: We need is another framework of the useful bits.
Jerry: totally, absolutely. And then you have, and then it’s the old XKCD, I forget which number that was, but but again it I struggle because there isn’t a there isn’t something that, that makes it obvious that, Hey. That’s a problem. [00:44:00] It’s intuitively obvious in hindsight that you shouldn’t store like forever files on the damn file transfer tool, right?
Like you should be cleaning that off periodically or in real time as you’re, Pulling data off of it, but that’s not what happens. And for the most part, like how many policies, how many companies security policies say would say that I don’t know that there’s many. Is that part of ISO 27, 000 or PCI?
Or no it’s not very clearly enumerated, but it is super important. The thing that is enumerated is you got to patch the thing. No, the thing exists, but I think there’s a, there’s also a very did I lose you?
Andrew: Yep. My Chrome.
Jerry: There’s a very real problem with data minimization. And I don’t mean that in terms of we’ve talked about it [00:45:00] in, in the context of you shouldn’t every stinking piece of data from your customers and squirrel the way I’m talking more does that data have to sit there? Can, or
Andrew: Right.
Jerry: can you move it? And especially important. When you got something sitting on the edge, right? This was a device that was exposed to the internet.
Andrew: Yeah. The tough part is probably 95 to 99 percent of the time. That’s never a problem. And cleaning up old files is probably not high value leverage work for a lot of employees, but
It’s like a whole data classification system. Nobody wants to do it. It’s too much of a pain in the butt until the one time it bites you.
Jerry: Yeah. I think, the other thing that bothers me a little bit about this is that companies will make that trade off, right? Like I, sure I could have, I could pay [00:46:00] Bob to sit there and delete those files. Or I could pay Bob to go do something more productive, it’s the, it’s it’s the people whose data is represented there who are actually to be the one that’s, it’s harmed in this and they don’t get a,
Andrew: Sure.
Jerry: And that’s right.
Andrew: an easy solve may be just an auto expire like 30 days. It’s auto deleted.
Jerry: Which comes back to
Andrew: And you just,
Jerry: responsibility, should that have been the default setting?
Andrew: yeah,
Jerry: I
Andrew: it’s,
Jerry: I don’t know. Anyway,
Andrew: it was progress
Jerry: was
Andrew: the way. I did confirm it was indeed progress. Yes.
Jerry: yes. They’ve had a long run of spectacular F ups.
Andrew: Your old man memory was accurate in this case.
Jerry: Back in my day, progress was a database.
Andrew: That’s [00:47:00] true.
Jerry: surprised to hear that progress is all this other crap. And apparently no database. So time times are funny. Funny. What happens over
Andrew: They lost it somewhere.
Jerry: All right.
Andrew: Anyway.
Jerry: I think we’re, I think we’ve we peaked and we’re on our way back down and so we will end it here.
Andrew: Oh, I hope people enjoyed our first video podcast, the defensive security show.
Jerry: We will do better next time. I’m
Andrew: It only took 279 episodes. Yes. We will do better next time. And we had a little technical bubble there. I don’t know how much it’s going to show up, but hopefully we’ll get it sorted out.
Jerry: Yeah, your your browser won’t stay running, huh? Call the neighbor kids. You come look at
Andrew: I’m just hoping I didn’t lose too much of my side of the recording. [00:48:00] That’s all
Jerry: good point.
Andrew: we’ll see. We’ll sort it out. But anyway,
Jerry: thank you for listening. You can find this the show and all of our previous episodes on our website at www. defensivesecurity. org. You can find the podcast on just about every podcast service under the sun. And if we aren’t on one, if let us know and we will we’ll get that fixed. You can follow Mr. Callot on X for me. I really hate that name by the way. It’s just like
Andrew: I still call a Twitter, I’m old,
Jerry: Oh, go ahead. Where can they find you?
Andrew: On Twitter and both and infosec. exchange at lerg L E R G.
Jerry: All right. Good deal. You can find me on infosec. exchange at Jerry. And with that, we will talk to you again real soon.
Andrew: Have a great week guys. Bye bye.
