Mar 06 2025 51 mins 13
On Friday 21 February 2025, Professor Johannes Waardenburg gave the Middle East Centre’s Friday seminar Biography: Professor JST Waardenburg teaches the general history of the Arab world at the IULM in Milan. As a
historian, he specialises in the period of the Ba‘th party in power in 20th century Syria. In 2021 he published two
volumes with the Nallino Institut in Rome, ‘La Siria contemporanea : ridisegnando la carta del Vicino Oriente’, in
which he describes the transformations of the state economy in Syria and the diverse international backing the
As‘ad family has enjoyed.
Abstract: With the fall of the al-Asad dynasty in Syria in the early hours of Sunday 8th December 2024, nearly
fourteen years after the start of the Arab Spring, a question arises: Has the warning given by Bashshar al-Asad in
his speech at Damascus University in the autumn of 2005 come true? Have his departure and the breakdown of
al-muqāwamah wa-l-ṣumūd – identified commonly as the strategy of resistance – really brought chaos to the
region? If that is not the case, why did the decisive actors keep him in power in Syria for approximatively another
20 years after he made that presentation? Imagining al-Asad bluffed while he felt the whole international
community was after him in the 2005 follow-up to the murder of Rafīq al-Ḥarīrī, the Prime Minister who oversaw
Lebanon’s reconstruction*, why did no one at the time call his bluff out? Rather, looking at the remarkably rapid
reintroduction of Bashshar al-Asad to the international scene after 2005, this presentation will try to assess
critically what the chaos was that everyone was afraid of in the event of the al-Asads falling then. Why does this
same chaos seem manageable now? Have Western actors together with Turkey and the Gulf countries simply
studied the regional setup better, or might the incidence of Israel’s forever war strategy have been a decisive
factor for others to make a shift unthinkable until recently, for the sake of the future of the region.
*To clarify: at 23:03 & 24:08 in the recording, the specification of Rafīq al-Ḥarīrī's title (of Prime Minister) should
not be understood as referring to his institutional role at the time of his assassination on 14th February 2005. As
he didn't occupy that office anymore back then. al-Ḥarīrī had resigned on 20th October 2004 and a government
led by ʿUmar Karāmī had been set up less than a week later on 26th of October.
historian, he specialises in the period of the Ba‘th party in power in 20th century Syria. In 2021 he published two
volumes with the Nallino Institut in Rome, ‘La Siria contemporanea : ridisegnando la carta del Vicino Oriente’, in
which he describes the transformations of the state economy in Syria and the diverse international backing the
As‘ad family has enjoyed.
Abstract: With the fall of the al-Asad dynasty in Syria in the early hours of Sunday 8th December 2024, nearly
fourteen years after the start of the Arab Spring, a question arises: Has the warning given by Bashshar al-Asad in
his speech at Damascus University in the autumn of 2005 come true? Have his departure and the breakdown of
al-muqāwamah wa-l-ṣumūd – identified commonly as the strategy of resistance – really brought chaos to the
region? If that is not the case, why did the decisive actors keep him in power in Syria for approximatively another
20 years after he made that presentation? Imagining al-Asad bluffed while he felt the whole international
community was after him in the 2005 follow-up to the murder of Rafīq al-Ḥarīrī, the Prime Minister who oversaw
Lebanon’s reconstruction*, why did no one at the time call his bluff out? Rather, looking at the remarkably rapid
reintroduction of Bashshar al-Asad to the international scene after 2005, this presentation will try to assess
critically what the chaos was that everyone was afraid of in the event of the al-Asads falling then. Why does this
same chaos seem manageable now? Have Western actors together with Turkey and the Gulf countries simply
studied the regional setup better, or might the incidence of Israel’s forever war strategy have been a decisive
factor for others to make a shift unthinkable until recently, for the sake of the future of the region.
*To clarify: at 23:03 & 24:08 in the recording, the specification of Rafīq al-Ḥarīrī's title (of Prime Minister) should
not be understood as referring to his institutional role at the time of his assassination on 14th February 2005. As
he didn't occupy that office anymore back then. al-Ḥarīrī had resigned on 20th October 2004 and a government
led by ʿUmar Karāmī had been set up less than a week later on 26th of October.
